miles) from a 2400 head finishing facility was reduced by as much as 5% while that same house located 3218.7 m 
the responsibility of those who pollute (Randall, 1999) . For example, when the setback laws for Kentucky were first proposed, producers were required to own or long-O dor complaints related to animal production, term lease land within the prescribed setback length for particularly confined animal feeding operations production facilities. The impact of this requirement (CAFOs), have increased dramatically during the past would have increased the cost of production and potendecade. Livestock production facilities, regardless of the tially reduced output. In a perfect world, the level of waste disposal, feed management, or ventilation system output attained by setback regulations would be the employed produce more than 160 odorous compounds social optimal (i.e., odor externalities would be internal- (Funk, 2003) . This odor can impact the health, economic ized by the livestock production). status, and personal security of persons who live or work
The science of odor evaluation is subjective because near production sites as well as environmental quality many facets (e.g., character, acceptability, intensity, he- (Hoag and Roka, 1995; Roka and Hoag, 1996;  Letson donic tone, and so forth) can only be quantified by a and Gollehon, 1996; Hurley et al., 1996) . subjective instrument (the human nose). This subjectivRecent studies have attempted to measure the ecoity leads to a good deal of complication when it comes to nomic impact of livestock odors (specifically swine) on selecting appropriate odor criteria. The traditional atmothe environment by measuring the change in value of spheric (odor) dispersion models and modeling guidance surrounding properties. For example, Abeles-Allison and were originally developed to assess specific compound Connor (1990) found that the addition of 1000 head of concentration effects; assessing the effects of odors, howhogs (Sus scrofa) reduced surrounding property values ever, requires significant differences in approach. The by as much as $430 depending on the size of the producimplications of these differences make odor dispersion tion facility and the distance the property is located models less powerful in policy evaluation. In the absence from the production facility. Similarly, Palmquist et al.
of an odor dispersion model, this study uses a livestock (1997) showed that the value of a house 804.7 m (0.5 odor damage function estimated by Ready and Abdalla (2003) .
The purpose of this study is to measure "more effifacilities are the required distance from the setback feature. cient" setback lengths using economic modeling of setback acquisition cost and property damage reduction to assess the economic impact of Kentucky's livestock
THEORETICAL MODEL OF ODOR
production facility setbacks on the value of surrounding
SETBACK LENGTH
properties and farm financial management decisions. If
One purpose regulators cite for drafting and implethe setback length is too short, then there is evidence menting setback legislation from livestock production that surrounding properties and people suffer uncomfacilities is to protect homeowners from odor-related pensated damages. If, on the other hand, setback lengths impacts. Complying with setback lengths imposes addiare too large, then livestock producers may be paying tional cost to producers; thus, a profit maximizing promore than that required to compensate for odor-related ducer will attempt to minimize this cost. But when minenvironmental damages.
imizing cost, producers must also decide if they should protect themselves from construction of future homes
BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL SETTING
within the setback area. Most setback regulations require that newly constructed livestock production faciliIn August 1997, Kentucky Governor Paul Patton imties locate themselves the specified distance from existposed a 90-d moratorium on the issuance of permits for ing structures. But these laws do not prevent the public the construction of new livestock production facilities.
from building new homes within the setback area. In The governor imposed this moratorium largely in resome states, right to farm (or first in time, first in right) sponse to public concerns surrounding proposed investlaws are in place. But in Kentucky, for example, these ment in western Kentucky by two large, integrated swine new home owners can sue (and have successfully sued) production companies. A major concern was that curfor odor damages. The possibility of future lawsuits and rent regulation was not sufficient to protect people and associated fines represent a real cost that must be inproperty from the harmful effects of livestock odors.
cluded in the producer's (the firm's) cost function. To address odor-related concerns, Kentucky's NatuProducers have many decisions to make when siting ral Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet a new facility. One of the major decisions centers on land (NREPC) mandated a number of setback requirements ownership. In our analysis of the setback regulations, for livestock operations. Specifically targeted were proproducers are left with four distinct choices: (i) own all duction facilities with one-time site capacity Ͼ190 512 of the land required by the setback provision, (ii) rent/ kg (420 000 pounds) live weight (e.g., approximately lease the necessary land to meet the provision, (iii) take 1000 animal equivalent units; AEUs). The current legison the risk of encroachment and the subsequent lawlation (Kentucky Administrative Regulation 5: 009E, 1998) suits/fines/fees, or (iv) adopt odor-controlling technolostipulates setback lengths for both livestock production gies to reduce the likelihood of fines and reduce the facilities and livestock manure application areas. Table 1 size of the protected setback zone. The protected area reports setback lengths for livestock production facili-(r P ) is represented by a fee simple ownership of land ties (i.e., barns and manure storage).
area and/or a long-term lease/rental agreement. The Because this article is concerned only with odor-related nonprotected area (r NP ) is the length where the owner damages arising from livestock production facilities, our chooses not to prevent encroachment into his/her setfocus is the 457.2-and 914.4-m (1500-and 3000-ft) setback area by future property owners. The total setback back lengths for barns and manure storage (e.g., lagoons). length (r T ) is defined as the protected setback length Specifically, dwellings not owned by the applicant plus (r P ) ϩ the nonprotected setback length (r NP ) as denoted churches, schools, businesses, and other structures to in Eq. [1] . which the general public has access including parks must r T ϭ r P ϩ r NP [1] be 457.2 m (1500 ft) from production facilities. This setback length applies to features not in an incorporated
To maximize social surplus, regulators should set the city. If the nearest feature is within an incorporated city setback length (r T ) where the marginal benefits of odor limit, then production facilities must be setback 914.4 m reduction (MB O ) equal the marginal cost of odor reduc-(3000 ft). Kentucky livestock producers, as is the case tion (MC O ). This solution is achieved by maximizing the net benefits of odor reduction (NB O ), defined as the in most states, simply have to show that production 
where 
thus, NPC O increases at an increasing rate with respect to r NP . Also, as a consequence, TC O increases at an in- is a continuous, twice differentiable function that increases with the distance that the firm of r T . chooses to protect (r P ). It is assumed that the firm will
acquire protection over an area adjacent to the production facility. In Eq.
[4], Z P represents the exogenous
components associated with protection. The FOCs for Eq.
[5] with respect to r T , r P , r NP , and (in order) are provided below (Eq. [6]- [9] ). The second
[5] with respect to r T , r P , r NP , and can be formed into a bordered Hessian matrix H. The where
elements of the second and third principal minors of H can be defined such that H is negative definite. This
result guaranties that NB O is maximized. The necessary [4] conditions that guarantee that H is negative definite can The cost of odor reduction due to nonprotection, be obtained from the authors. NPC O , is also a continuous, twice differentiable function that increases with the distance that the firm chooses
[6] not to protect (r NP ). Following Harford (1978) , NPC O is composed of two parts, the probability of being fined
P) and the size of the fine (F). Increasing P or F will increase NPC O . Unlike Harford, to make the problem tractable, P is an exogenous constant. The size of the
[8] fine depends on the per-unit cost of damages ϫ the distance over which damages occur. New homes cannot be built any closer than r P to the firm. Thus, unit damages decreasing rate with respect to r T as required by Eq.
[5]. functions with respect to the total and protected setback lengths (r T and r P ) will equal P, the exogenous probabil-
ity of receiving a fine for odor damages. Given that 0 Յ P Յ 1, the MB O associated with r P will exceed the MB O associated with r T except when P ϭ 1, the point where Note that Eq.
[11] is defined for 0 m Յ r T Յ 1600 m. they are equal. Furthermore, given that the underlying At r T ϭ 0, the value of an individual home is reduced functions for MB O (r P ) and MB O (r T ) are the same and b 0 % (here 11.8%), the greatest possible reduction. At have a negative slope, r T will exceed r P ; thus, r NP will r T ϭ 1600 m, the value of a home is no longer impacted exceed 0. This is true except when P ϭ 1. At this point by odor. r T and r P are equal and r NP is 0. When
In Eq.
[11] and [12] , the parameter HV 0 represents equals 0 and r T is set at its maximum length, r NP is at its the average value (in $US) of homes in the area where maximum length, and r P is at its shortest length.
a producer plans to locate. The parameter HV 0 is exogenous and can assume any positive value. The average value of homes in the area will vary by location and 10 000 (1 ϩ g) [13] production facility to a house (in meters). Odor impact is calculated for individual homes. There is no aggregation Given that land is an asset, LAC is compounded by a across homes until after the property value impact is rate of asset appreciation (0 Յ g Յ 1; here g ϭ 0.03; calculated for each home. It is important to note that Barry, 1996) . The parameter LAC can be any value, this model is defined only for 500 m Յ r T Յ 1600 m.
AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
but the cash rental rate or annual land payment less Also, as is true in the Palmquist et al. model, there is returns (on a per-hectare basis) best represent LAC. no relationship between the capacity of the production Following Eq.
[6], Eq.
[13] is a continuous, twice differsite (measured in head or animal equivalent units) and entiable function that increases with r P . Note that r P is odor impact. While, perhaps, unintuitive, this is a consisconverted to hectares using the standard formula to tent result with important policy implications if true. calculate area and dividing by 10 000 m 2 ha Ϫ1 . Because this paper concerns the 457.2-and 914.4-m Again, NPC O is defined using work by Harford (1978) , (1500-and 3000-ft) setback lengths for newly con- Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979) , and Keeler (1991) . The structed livestock facilities (i.e., barns and manure storparameter NPC O is simply the product of the probability age) in Kentucky, the use of Eq. [10] is problematic given that it is defined for 500 m Յ r T Յ 1600 m. 
housing value. Here housing value ranged from a miniThe parameter P represents the firm's rational expecmum lower quartile value of $29 500 to a maximum upper tation of being sued for odor damages. The probability quartile value of $85 200. Median housing value ranged of being sued, P, is exogenously determined and can from $40 500 to $58 800 and averaged $53 573. Based assume any value between 0 and 1. This expectation is on this range, HV 0 was assigned values of $40 000 and reasonably based on the area (high or low protection $60 000 in low protection areas. area) and the average value of the home. However, The parameter HV 1 represents expectations concernother factors like neighbor's familiarity with agricultural ing the value of homes that might encroach into setback production practices and social involvement of the firm areas and trigger future lawsuits. Values of HV 1 are in the community play a role. The parameter NPC O is based on ranges presented above for median housing a continuous, twice differentiable function that increases value in the high and low protection areas. In high prowith P and r NP as required by Eq. [7] and [8] .
tection areas HV 1 is expected to be $0 to $50 000 higher The parameter HV 1 in Eq. [14] is similar to the paramthan HV 0 . Thus, in high protection areas, HV 1 takes on eter HV 0 in Eq. [11] in that it represents the average the values of $100 000 and $150 000 when HV 0 is value of homes (in $US). However, in this case HV 1 is $100 000 and the values of $150 000 and $200 000 when the expected value of homes that are expected to move HV 0 is $150 000. The parameter HV 1 in low protection into the unprotected setback area defined by r NP . The areas is calculated similarly, but the added values are parameter HV 1 is exogenous and will vary by location $0 and $20 000. (i.e., according to the type of protection areas). Yet, it
The parameter P was incremented from 0 to 1 by is assumed that HV 1 will be equal to or exceed HV 0 steps of 0.1 (i.e., P was assigned 11 values). only). Over the same period crop land averaged nearly $3707 ha Ϫ1 ($1500 acre Ϫ1 ) or 17 times of the rental rate.
Assuming a 20-yr loan at 8%, the annual cost of purchasing land calculates to $377.53 ha Ϫ1 ($152.78 acre
Ϫ1
). The
KFBM association data suggest that the difference between the average amortized value of land and the average cash rental rate is approximately equal to the return MODEL DATA to land. Thus, the cash rental rate is a fair approximation Because Eq.
[15] includes a third-degree polynomial for the cost of land. In this investigation, LAC is assumed and interaction terms of the choice variables, changes to range from $81.54 to $247.10 ha Ϫ1 ($33-$100 acre Ϫ1 ). in the optimal values of r T , r P , and r NP with respect to the exogenous variables HV 0 , LAC, P, and HV 1 had to be derived analytically. Using the General Algebraic
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Modeling System (GAMS) computer program, values
The first objective of this research is to estimate "more of r T , r P , and r NP were calculated for sequential values efficient" setback lengths for a range of economic condiof the exogenous variables.
tions. Using GAMS to optimize Eq. [15] , where the exoThe parameter HV 0 was assigned four values, two genous variables of HV 0 , LAC, P, and HV 1 in Eq.
[15] representing the median and high value for housing in are assigned the values reported above, resulted in 176 rural, low protection areas and two representing the observations. Values for r T , r P , and r NP are summarized median and high values for housing in more urban, high in Tables 2 and 3 for low and high protection areas, protection areas. Data from U.S. Census Bureau (2003) respectively. To limit table size, setback lengths are rewas used to determine the values for HV 0 (and HV 1 ).
ported only for P values of 0, 0.10, 0.50, 0.90, and 1. The top 10 Kentucky counties based on median housing Note that in Table 4 , the net social benefits (or costs of value were used to determine the range for HV 0 in high odor reduction) are measured as changes in per firm protection areas. Here housing value ranged from a NB O arising from changes in r T (thus, changes in r P and minimum lower quartile value of $77 600 to a maximum r NP ). The firm cost of odor reduction is measured as the upper quartile value of $219 200. Median housing value per-meter setback cost paid by the firm-a weighted ranged from $103 000 to $158 600 and averaged $117 690.
average of the costs associated with r P and the costs Based on this range, HV 0 was assigned values of $100 000 associated with r NP . Table 4 also reports the cost (in and $150 000 in high protection areas.
Data from 15 counties were used to determine the terms of lost social welfare) of the 457.2-m (1500-ft) Also note that as the rate of change in r P exceeds the rate of change in r P and r T with respect to HV 1 decreases in absolute value. On the other hand, with increases in rate of change in r T , r NP shrinks rapidly as HV 0 increases. Intuitively, this result suggests that higher initial benefits LAC the rate of change in r P and r T with respect to HV 1 increases in absolute value. are indicative of longer optimal setback lengths. Furthermore, the higher the initial benefit, the greater the The second objective of this research is to assess the economic impact of Kentucky's livestock production incentive for the firm to assume protection cost. At higher LAC, r T and r P are shorter, but the rate of increase facility setbacks relative to the calculated, "more efficient" lengths. Across the values considered, r T ranged in r T and r P with respect to HV 0 is higher. At higher values of P, the rate of increase in r T and r P with respect from 1421.3 to 1592.4 m (approximately 1600 m) and averaged 1523 m in low protection areas. In contrast, to HV 0 slows and the rate of change in r P approaches the rate of change in r T .
the state mandated setback length for low protection areas in Kentucky is 457.2 m. In high protection areas, Unlike HV 0 , r P increases as HV 1 increases, but r T decreases, other things being equal. The expected future where the state mandated setback length is 914.4 m, r T ranged from 1513.3 to 1600 m and averaged 1561.3 m. value of homes built within the setback area if left unprotected, HV 1 , is associated with the fine a firm will pay Although only 38.2 m different, the mean setback values for low and high protection areas are statistically differif successfully sued. This result indicates that a higher potential fine shortens r NP by simultaneously increasing r P ent with 99% confidence. Under no condition did the model generate a value and decreasing r T . The intuition behind this finding is illustrated by Fig. 1 . As P increases, the rate of change in of r T equal to the state mandated setback length. Further investigation reveals that r T will equal 457.2 m in low r P with respect to HV 1 decreases to 0. The rate of change in r T with respect to HV 1 increases with P, reaches a protection areas when P is between 0.17 and 1.06%, depending on LAC, HV 0 , and HV 1 . In high protection maximum, and then decreases. As HV 0 increases the areas, r T will equal 914.4 m for values of P between incorporated city … specifically, dwellings not owned by the applicant plus churches, schools, businesses, and 0.31and 1.96%. These results indicate that Kentucky's legislated odor setback lengths assume a low probability other structures to which the general public has access including parks." High protection areas represent nonof the firm being sued and fined.
The results of Table 4 indicate that Kentucky's legisrural areas or rural areas near an incorporated city where development pressures and the demand for houslated odor setback lengths compared with the optimum results are unfavorable to society. At r T * for the 176 ing (thus average home value) are high. By regulation, "if the nearest feature is within an incorporated city estimates, per firm NB O ranged from $2.81 to $4.48 million (mean $3.62 million) in low protection areas and limit, then production facilities must be setback 3000 feet" (914.4 m). ranged from $7.27 to $11.19 million (mean $9.21 million) in high protection areas. Setting r T to 457.2 m in low
The results of this study suggest that the 457.2-and 914.4-m setback lengths for low and high protection protection areas and 914.4 m in high protection areas reduced NB O . At 457.2 m, NB O ranges from $1.68 to areas, respectively, are too short for the conditions considered. At the minimum, the setback length should be $2.45 million (mean $2.11 million), a statistically significant reduction of $1.52 million at the mean (99% con-1421 m in low protection areas and 1513 m in high protection areas. Livestock production firms are worse fident). At 914.4 m, NB O ranges from $6.45 to $9.77 million (mean $8.10 million), a statistically significant off under the longer setback lengths (by as much as $300 m Ϫ1 ), but the losses to surrounding home owners reduction of $1.11 million at the mean (99% confident). Interestingly, at the mean, lost social welfare is higher far exceed the firm gains at the legislated setbacks. This result implies that Kentucky's legislated setback lengths in low protection areas than it is in high protection areas.
Although unfavorable to society, at the mean (99% confident). At 914.4 m, firm cost ranges results of this research suggest that the plaintiff is justified in bringing the suit. Furthermore, at the legislated from $0 to $73.11 m Ϫ1 (mean $44.20) representing a statistically significant reduction of $106.14 m Ϫ1 at the mean setback length, livestock producing firms are not encouraged to research, develop, or implement odor re-(99% confident). In the case of firm cost reduction, firms are better off under state regulation in low protection duction, best management practices, or technologies. Although statistically different, results indicate that areas. This result is consistent with intuition because the firm will pay more to comply with a 914.4-m vs. 457.2-m the setback length for low protection areas be 38 m longer at the mean (a maximum of 100 m longer) than setback length. the length for high protection areas. Economic theory has been used to demonstrate that site-specific regula-CONCLUSIONS tion minimizes social cost relative to uniform regulation because firms are able to take advantage of spatial difAir quality and odor nuisance regulation have become ferences in marginal cost. The results of this study supkey issues in many states in the USA. Traditionally, odor port this finding. However, site-specific regulations are nuisance was considered a legal matter and solutions to hard to enforce, politically unpopular, and subject to odor problems were dealt with by the common law concept legal challenges. As a consequence, regulators prefer of nuisance (Watts and Sweeten, 1995) . Unlike water uniform regulation. An implication of this study is that quality issues that can be measured and monitored, it is a single setback length of 1550 m is possible. This is the more difficult to objectively measure livestock odor. Beaverage length across all conditions considered. cause of heightened public concern, extensive research Finally, a finding of this study is that the firm has no to measure, eliminate, or, at least, reduce odors has incentive to completely protect the legislated setback received political attention. Currently, regulations relength unless the probability of being sued is high garding livestock odors focus on separation distances (Ͼ70%) and the fine is high. This finding is in agreement (setback policy) between facilities or manure storage, with Harford (1978) and others. This outcome is also and the nearest nonowner residence or public area.
true, even at the lengths currently mandated by the state In Kentucky, the Natural Resources and Environof Kentucky. In this study the fine is partly defined by mental Protection Cabinet (NREPC) has instituted setthe expected value of housing built within the setback back provisions. In this study low protection areas are area if that area is not protected. If there is a 70% defined as rural areas where there are few homes, little probability of being sued, the expected value of housing demand for housing, and little development pressure; only needs to exceed the current value of housing by thus, the average value of a home is low. These areas $20 000 to trigger full protection. Current value is meaare protected by a 457.2-m (1500-ft) setback length from sured at the point in time when the firm decided to barns and manure storage (e.g., lagoons). Low protection areas are legally defined as "features not in an locate in an area. In addition, the higher the current 
